La brecha descripción-experiencia: un metanálisis
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https://doi.org/10.19230/jonnpr.3658Palabras clave:
brecha descripción-experiencia, conducta de elección, toma de decisiones, Teoría de los Prospectos CumulativosResumen
La conducta de elección difiere según cómo se presente la información de las opciones a los sujetos, via descripciones o experiencia(1), un fenómeno llamado la brecha descripción-experiencia. La Teoría de los Prospectos(2) apunta una sobre-ponderación de eventos raros; pero cuando se experimentan opciones en lugar de describirse, se encuentra el resultado opuesto: los eventos raros se infravaloran (1,3). Nuestro meta-análisis estudió tres factores importantes sobre la brecha descripción-experiencia relacionada con la teoría de la perspectiva acumulativa: la sobrevaloración y la subestimación de eventos raros en tareas basadas en la descripción y la experiencia, el dominio de la tarea y la probabilidad del evento raro. Además de estos tres elementos, se estudiaron otros tres factores adicionales: la existencia de una opción determinada, el paradigma de la tarea de descripción y el paradigma de la tarea de experiencia. Recientemente, se publicó un metaanálisis sobre este tema(4), que se centró en un tipo específico de paradigma de tarea de experiencia llamado muestreo. En el presente meta-análisis, nos centramos en el otro paradigma de la tarea de experiencia principal, el paradigma de retroalimentación, y la combinación de ambos paradigmas, para ver si podíamos encontrar efectos diferenciales entre su enfoque meta-analítico y el nuestro. Sin embargo, éste no fue el caso, ya que encontramos resultados similares: el efecto es consistente en todos los factores y métodos. Concluimos que el hecho de que el modelo de referencia(2) es descriptivo y que el factor más frecuentemente evocado para explicar la brecha entre la descripción y la experiencia sean los sesgos de muestreo en las tareas basadas en la experiencia, que son parte de la metodología de la tarea misma, sugiere que la brecha descripción-experiencia es un fenómeno psicológico irreducible (es decir, un fenómeno que no se basa en otros mecanismos psicológicos, sino únicamente en la metodología de la tarea).
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