MULLA SADRA SHIRAZI'S VIEWS ON AVICENNA THEORY OF SOUL


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Abstract. The main questions addressed in this study are: How does Avicenna define the soul? What are the shortcomings of Avicenna definition of soul as viewed by Mulla Sadra Shirazi? and how can these shortcomings be overcome? What is the status of human's body as viewed by these two philosophers? Is the composition of soul and body a composition by way of composition by way of unification or a composition by way of annexation?

Following Aristotle, Avicenna defines the soul as the primordial perfection of the natural body and he attempts to eliminate its deficiencies. According to him, soul is intrinsically non-material in terms of contingency and survival and when the body is created the soul is created too and then is mixed with the body. Therefore, the question that comes to our mind is: How it is possible for an non-material thing (the soul) to be in relation with a material thing (the body)?

From Mulla Sadra's point of view, the Aristotelian anthropology pertains to the essence of the soul, and the soul is nothing but a measure of the body. Mulla Sadra believes that the soul at its first stage of creation is a physical entity that ultimately turns into an immortal thing in the light of substantional motion.

One of the findings of this study is that based on the theory of “corporeality of body in its generation and its spirituality in perpetuity”, the human discursive soul can be assumed as a composition by way of unification of the body and soul and in this way, it is possible to solve the problem of the relationship between the peripatetic body and soul.

Keywords: rational human soul, substantial motion, analogicity, Composition by way of annexation, Composition by way of unification

1. INTRODUCTION

The study of the human discursive soul as one of the major issues central to anthropology by scholars of wisdom and mysticism has a long history in such a way that philosophers and mystics have allocated part of their work to explore the human soul. The soul had a special position for Aristotle and he considered the study of soul more important than any other sciences (Aristotle, 1990). Besides, its reality and nature are very difficult to understand (Mulla Sadra, 1981). Mesbah Yazdi, the Iranian Islamic scholar, believes that given the association of the soul with resurrection its discussion is of special significance in Islamic culture, and the belief that it is possible to prove the existence of resurrection without proving the independence of the soul is a naive and simplistic view (Mesbah Yazdi, 1997).

Two Iranian philosophers, Sheikh Al-Rais with his own peripatetic dispositions and Sadrol Mote'allehin with his transcendental wisdom are trying to scrutinize the soul and analyze its various dimensions: What are the definitions of the soul? Which definition is more acceptable? What did the previous scholar mean by any of the accepted constraints? What are the different probabilities and which probability is preferable? Is the definition of the soul a real or virtual definition? Is such definition restrictive or descriptive? How is the relationship between the soul and the body? Is their combination mechanical or real? Is the soul essence or form? Is it material or non-material? Is it new or old? What are the reasons for each? What is the strength and weakness of each argument?

Given the extensive nature of the various aspects of the concept of the soul, the present article merely explains the definition and the creation of the soul and its relation to the body from Avicenna’s perspective. Then, this perspective is explored using unique innovations made by Mulla Sadrai Shirazi including substantional motion, primacy of existence, and analogical gradation.

Research on discussions related to the soul suggests that theories of peripatetic philosophers particularly those of Aveccina pave the ground for Mulla Sadra’s theories about the soul. Although Mulla Sadra apparently accepted the Aristotelian definition of soul accepted, he proposed a very different and profound perspective about soul and managed to solve many problems of peripatetic philosophy about the soul including the quality of the relationship between the soul and body in the light of this perspective. Although a couple of studies have been performed in this field, a more comprehensive and comparative analysis of Aveccina’s and Mulla Sadra’s views about the soul seems essential given the extensive and profound nature of discussions of the soul. To this end, the present study employs a descriptive-analytic methodology and tries to explain and analyze the subject using authentic and original resources.

1.1. Avicenna (370-428) and the definition of the soul

Among the important issues that have long been considered by philosophers throughout the history of philosophy is the definition of the soul. Following Aristotle, Avicenna has defined the soul as the primordial perfection of the natural organic body (Ibn Sina, 1404 & 1404, Aristotle, 1999).

Avicenna considers the primordial perfection as a feature that is manifested in the actual and physical embodiment of an object such as the shape for the sword, while the secondary perfection as a feature that follows the nature of the object in in its interactions such as the sharpness for the sword (Ibn Sina, 1403 & 1404).

He also considers the natural body as a tool and potentiality used by the soul to communicate with minor and insignificant affairs, as the soul is essentially non-material and is not able to do an action or cause an effect without having a tool at its disposable (Ibn Sina, 2004). The difference is that Aristotle considers the soul a form which is embodied in the body and does not define it as a simple, indivisible, non-material, and independent object (Aristotle, 1999). In contrast, Avicenna’s conception of the soul is an independent and non-material substance that belongs to the body (Ibn Sina, 1404) and communicates tactically through physical potentialities with the body as a reality which is different from the soul and its potentialities. This communication leads to the actual composition of the soul and the body and the realization of human kind (Tusi, 1996).

In the definition of the soul, Avicenna prefers perfection over the form and justifies his position by pointing out that “Every form is perfect, but every perfection is not a form, and since the immanent form is present within the object and depends on it, it does not entail a soul separable and non-material from the object. However, perfection includes both separable and non-separable soul. Besides, perfection when is
juxtaposed to the object manifests its actions and effects, while form is considered as a part of the object and it is not able to bring about any action or any effect on its own (Ibn Sina, 1404).

In addition, in his definition of the soul, Avicenna prefers perfection over potentiality. For if the potentiality means both action and reaction, then referring it to as the soul is an equivocality of names, and if one of its two meanings is intended, then the definition of the soul is incomplete and entails a distinction without a difference, because the soul has both receptive and efficient meanings. But the term “perfection” means both active and passive in commonality of meaning (Ibn Sina, 1404).

Furthermore, in the definition of the soul, the natural body is contrasted with the artificial body. For instance, the soul is not considered perfection for artificial objects such as tables and chairs. Here the natural body refers to an object whose potentiality and tools bring about secondary perfection. Similarly, the soul is not regarded as perfection for fire and the earth. Primordial perfection refers to a feature whose essence and nature depends on it and its existence and non-existence result in the existence and non-existence of the object. In addition, primordial perfection when contrasted with secondary perfection means actions, effects, states, and qualities of the soul, each being attributed to a potentiality of the soul (Ibn Sina, 1404).

Avicenna comes to the conclusion that Aristotle’s definition of the soul is not a real definition and does not reflect the essential nature of the soul but suggests the way the soul is combined with and controlled by the body, as the truth of the soul is a self-identity with an essential nature. However, the Aristotelian definition of the soul focuses on the perfection of the soul and the perfection is an additive characteristic that is embedded in a category (Ibn Sina, 2006). In other words, this definition only considers the soul as an additive property without paying attention to its reality. Therefore, it is not possible to understand the substantial nature of the soul by recognizing its additive feature; in the same way that it is not possible to say that an architect is essentially a human being (Ibn Sina, 2006).

In other words, according to Avicenna, the truth of the soul is embedded within its essence and its additive feature is considered as an accidental property (Ibn Sina, 1404). This means that Avicenna believed in two intrinsic and accidental aspects for the soul. The intrinsic, independent, essential, and non-material aspect of the soul is addressed in theology, while its physical accidental aspect which is dependent on the body is studied by in natural sciences.

1.3. Differences in Mulla Sadra’s (979-1050) and Avicenna’s (370-428) definitions of the soul

Mulla Sadra accepts the same common definition of the soul proposed by Avicenna (Mulla Sadra, 1990), but he considers it from a different perspective. Unlike Avicenna, Mulla Sadra considers the definition of the soul a true definition governing the tacit identity of the soul and believes that the soul is the form of the body and it will preserve its formal and physical properties as long as it serves as the body’s form (Mulla Sadra, 1990). However, when it is totally turned into an immateriality through substantial motion and analogical gradation it is considered as wisdom rather than the soul.

In other words, Avicenna considers the human soul at the beginning of its creation as a non-material substance, while Mulla Sadra regards it as a physical substance. Accordingly, Mulla Sadra like other scholars considers the vegetative soul as a material substance. However, he considers the animal and human soul as the material soul which in the light of substantial motion turns into the material soul, then into the material-imaginal soul, then into the material-imaginal soul, and finally into the pure imaginal soul. In rare cases, he considers the human soul as the material, imaginal, and rational soul and then the imaginal-rational soul (Mulla Sadra, 1982).

In addition, primordial perfection according to Mulla Sadra refers to feature whose essentiality is actualized through its form. For instance, a sword is distinguished from other objects by its own form. Therefore, according to him, the soul has a physical essence at the beginning of its creation and then it continues its evolutionary path through substantial motion and passes a set of hierarchical orders to reach rational immateriality by the preservation of its individual unity. Mulla Sadra does not consider the relationship between the body and soul as a categorical relationship such as the relationship between the captain and the ship, in which each entity has its own independent existence. Besides, he does not believe in the view that belonging to the body has been affected by the essence of the soul but in his opinion, the soul inherently belongs to the body and matter, and that the soul’s relationship with the body is abstracted from the quality of the existence of the soul and as a result, the composition of the soul and the body is merely composition by way of unification that is
In other words, according to Mulla Sadra, the common definition of the soul reflects the truth and the essence of the soul and its combination with the body is a part of its truth. Therefore, to say that the soul has an independent identity combined with an accidental existence cannot be true, because the essence of the soul contrary to an architect is inconceivable without its composition to the body. In other words, the essence of an architect can be taken for granted without considering his architectural works. However, the nature of the soul cannot be taken for granted without assuming its composition with the body (Mulla Sadra, 1990).

Mulla Sadra believes that if the soulfulness of the soul in the initial stage of creation is accidental to the essential and non-material nature of the soul, then there should be a rational essence acquired from the non-material world to be transferred to the material world and owned by the body. However, the essential nature of objects does not dissipate and the essence of immaterially is not subject to accidents. In addition, the soul occurrence to its essential and immaterial nature is an inherent or separable accident. However, the inherent accident cannot be separated from its subject and the separable accident is conditional upon its aptitude and materiality (Mulla Sadra, 1990).

Avicenna does not accept the metaphor of the form for the soul because if the soul is in the rank of form for the body which is represented in the matter, then the soul should be destroyed upon the decay of the body. However, from Mulla Sadra’s point of view, as long as the soul has not transformed from the stage of the physical existence to the independent stage of rational actuality, it will have a material form that can be material or non-material depending on its proximity to the rational existence and the extent of its weakness and perfection in its existential level.

1.4. Avicenna and the relationship between the soul and body

One of the most serious and challenging disputes among philosophers in the past and present is the issue of the quality of the possession of the soul by the body. A number of questions have been posed in this regard: How a non-material object can interact with a material object? Who is it possible for an object that lacks mass and weight to be associated with and move an object with mass and weight?

Avicenna sees that mind and body as two independent beings that are associated with and affected by each other when the body is alive. Interpreting Avicenna’s view, Khajeh Nasir-o-din Tusi points out: If the body’s actions and potentialities are repeated they first are in a temporary and transitional mode that is called disposition and then upon further repetition they will assume a routinized and popular state that is called habit and thus the soul is affected by the body and its potentialities, because such an state does not occur by itself in the soul without the intervention of the body. In addition, sometimes there exist a state in the soul that affects the body and its physical forces. For instance, when a person remembers God and his awe, his body starts to tremble (Ibn Sina, 1996).

From Avicenna’s point of view, the soul is dependent on the body upon its creation, but it does not need the body to survive, and the relation between the soul and the body is like the relationship between the captain and the ship, which, although the captain is independent of the ship, but is responsible for the protection and guidance of the ship, and this is regarded as a perfection for the captain (Ibn Sina, 1404 & 2007). He believes that after the creation of the elements by God, he also created various temperaments for each element, and the temperament which was closer to moderation was assigned to the mankind so that the human soul would use it as its nest.

In his interpretation of the phrase “so that the human soul would use it as its nest”, Khajeh Nasir-o-din Tusi believes that it makes a subtle reference to the immateriality of the soul “because Bu Ali (Avicenna) in this sentence likens the relationship between the soul to the temperament as the relationship between the bird and its nest”(Tusi,1996). Therefore, it can be said that according to Avicenna, the relationship between body and soul is an accidental relationship not an essential relationship, because of the latter occurs when the both sides of the relationship are not essence while both the body and soul are in fact essence (Ibn Sina, 1404 & 2007).

However, it should be noted that according to Avicenna though the relationship between the soul and body is not an essential relationship, it is a real and ontological relationship; as the body is not a created thing without the soul. In addition, despite the fact that the soul is a non-material essential substance, it is a created thing because of its real relationship with the body. Therefore, the
body is the determinant of the soul. The reason is that if the soul is created at a particular time by an non-material cause it entails making a preference (Ibn Sina, 1404)

Avicenna does not believe in the internal and substantial transformation of the soul and considers the soul to be an non-material substance, which lacks the potentiality of moving to the actuality. In his view, the evolution and transformation of the soul occurs in the form of accidental changes that have an external evolutionary existence. Contrary to other non-material objects, the soul can accommodate to various accidents in terms of its connection and composition with the body. Therefore, it can be subject to accidental changes. This means that the accidents combined with the soul have realities that are inconsistent with the essence of the soul and are added to it gradually (Ibn Sina, 1404)

However, it seems that Avicenna's view is not free from problems, because the prerequisite for movement in non-material matters, whether accidental or substantial, in non-material objects is to accept changes and transformation in abstract and non-material objects. In addition, according to Mulla Sadra, the state accident is one of the requirements of the essence and the movement in the accident is a requirement for the movement in the essence.

1.5. Avicenna and potentialities of the soul

Avicenna considers the soul as the non-physical source of all potentialities which are secondary to and the effect of the soul (Tusi, 1996). In his view, the soul is a simple unified essence that performs its actions through its potentialities. These potentialities are accidental to the body and they are used by the soul to establish a strategic relation to the body.

Like other peripatetic philosophers, Avicenna believes that the potentialities of the vegetative soul include nutritive, growth, faculty of generation, and the potentialities of the animal soul are divided into perceptive and motive potentialities. Perceptive potentialities include outward senses (tactile, visual, taste, hearing, and smell) and inner senses (common sense, fantasy, imagination, memory, faculty of disposal). In addition, motive potentialities include impulsive power (power of anger and desire) and actions. The potentialities of the human soul also include theoretical intellect (material, dispositional, actual, and acquired) and the practical intellect.

Given the immateriality of the soul, Avicenna believes that the soul is not combined with the body and physical potentialities, but the body and potentialities are in the service of the human soul. The soul conquers them and it has a developmental dominance over them. Potentialities are in fact the conquered actors of the human soul and are controlled by it. Therefore, immediate actions taken by the potentialities are considered as intermediate actions of the human soul (Ibn Sina, 1404 & 2007)

He considers the human soul at the very beginning of its creation as a perfect substance, which perceptions do not change in its essence, and what is added through science and perceptions to the human soul is considered as the second-order perfections and accidents for the soul. In addition, Avicenna believes that perceptive forces whose identity is different from that of the soul are instruments and tools used by the soul to perceive things (Ibn Sina, 1404; Tusi, 1996).

1.6. Criticisms raised by Mulla Sadra (979-1050) against Avicenna’s (370-428) view about the relationship between the soul and body

Although Mulla Sadra agrees with Avicenna on some issues, he disputes him in some cases. For instance, he argues: How is it possible for the soul as an independent substance to be combined with its primordial perfection? The reason for such denial is that the former is existence-for-itself, while the latter is existence-for-something else. In addition, another criticism raised by Mulla Sadra is: How can one assume that the non-material substance of the soul and the material substance of the body are united and form a single identity as human being? (Mulla Sadra, 1996).

Obviously, if the relationship between soul and body is considered as the composition by the way of annexation, then the question is: How is it possible for two objects that are inconsistent in nature to be placed together and be interconnected? Also in accordance with philosophical rule “Each incident is preceded by the matter and time”, how can one assume that the creation of the human soul to be conditional upon and preceded by the physical conditions such as mater and time? (Mulla Sadra, 1981).

Therefore, considering the above problems, Mulla Sadra has presented the theory of essential and existential composition of the soul and body based on the principality of the existence, the analogical gradation of the existence, and substantive motion. He considers the soul as an existence with a composition by the way of annexation, and the soul is like a form whose existence-for-itself is the same as an additional existence for the body.
Therefore, the definition of the soul is a true definition, not an additional definition (Mulla Sadra, 1982).

According to the principle of the analogy of gradation, the existence is an objective and unitary truth of varying degrees, and the commonality and differentiation of its instances is characterized by unity in plurality. Accordingly, Mulla Sadra considers the soul and its potentialities as a unitary existence with some degrees, in the sense what eats at the level of nutritive potentiality is the soul not the nutritive power, and what sees at the level of vision potentiality is the soul not the vision. In the same way, what thinks at the level of intellectual potentiality is the soul not the intellectual power. He believes that vegetative, animal, and human potentialities are in fact the same as the soul or, to be more precise, they are degrees and levels of the soul, so that the soul in vegetative, nutritive, and sensation degrees is visionary and in terms of human potentialities is rational. This means that these potentialities are not independent from the soul. Therefore, unlike Avicenna, Mulla Sadra does not believe in separate faculties/potentialities such as nutrition, hearing, and intellect that deal with eating, seeing, and thinking and then report to the soul, but these faculties are the same as the human soul (Mulla Sadra, 1981).

And on the basis of the substantial motion, as accidents change, the essence of accidents also goes through a gradual evolution and movement, and since accidents do not exist independently from their essence, therefore, changes in accidents follows changes in the essence of objects. Accordingly, Mulla Sadra believes that the human soul unlike vegetative and animal souls is able to ascend from the material level to the non-material level in the arc of ascent of intellectual abstraction gradually through the substantial and intensifying movement, which means the soul can possess all three levels of existence, i.e. natural, imaginary, and rational levels (Mulla Sadra, 1981).

Therefore, according to Mulla Sadra, the relationship between actions and faculties/potentialities is the same as their relationship to the soul. That is, the potentialities of the soul and the positions and levels of the soul attributed to them are attributable to the levels and positions of the soul. Besides, the relationship between the soul and the senses is the same as the relationship the senses and the sensual forms. Similarly, its relationship to imagination and intellect is the same is the relationships between imagination and imaginary forms, and between matter and intellectual forms, respectively (Mulla Sadra, 1981).

In addition, the soul is a gradated concept with different grades and levels that passes through a number of existential grades until it reaches abstraction and immateriality. The first grade is the physical faculty or primary matter that is free from any formal and perceptual perfection. It then turns into a natural matter that is able to perceive senses by employing physical faculties. In other words, it can be said that the soul at the sensual level is actually perceptive and potentially imaginable and rational. Then relying on the substantial motion and physical forces, the soul’s need for senses reduces and the physical members are promoted to spiritual members. In the next stage, the soul transcends the imaginal matters and is able to potentially realize rational matters. This is the highest position that human beings can achieve through a rational ascension (Mulla Sadra, 1981). In other words, in the light of the rule “soul’s creation is corporeal and its survival is spiritual”, the physical soul can pass through vegetative and animal stages via the substantial motion to reach the level of intellectual abstraction.

Mulla Sadra regards the body as the matter of the soul and the soul as the bodily form. According to him, there is an essential relationship between the body and the soul as is the case for the matter and form. This means that the soul is dependent on the body in its etification and creation and the body is dependent on the soul in its happening (Mulla Sadra, 1981). However, Avicenna assumes that the body is the determinant for actualization of the soul rather than a location for the soul. This suggests that unless material conditions are satisfied, the soul does not combine with the body (Tusi, 1996).

To prove the physical occurrence of the human discursive soul, Mulla Sadra argues that if the human soul exists before the creation of the body or it exists based in its rational essence and then the accidental nature of the soul happens to it, this requires that a quality that has not existed before in the world of intellect occurs, and if the soul is considered as a permanent existence and the quality of being the soul is inherent in it then there will be an ineffectuality in the world of being (Mulla Sadra, 1975&1984).

In the explanation of Mulla Sadra's view, it can be suggested that it would be rationally impossible for the quality of being the soul to be accident for an non-material object, as such an object possess in actuality all qualities that can possibly exist for it, and this is not true to say that the non-material object possesses a potential quality that is actualized by the passage of time. In addition, one cannot assume this contradiction that the soul has inherently a composite nature but some of its
composing elements have not existed for a time period.

Therefore, Mulla Sadra does not assume that the soul is of an accidental nature but sees it as an essential substance that is specific to the soul itself that goes through some stages of perfection and ascendance to turn essentially from potential intellect into active intellect (Mulla Sadra, 1981; 1982; n. d).

In other words, although the definition of the soul from the perspective of Mulla Sadra focuses on the composition of the soul with the body, the soul does not have a reality apart from its composite nature. This means that the soul like other typical forms in addition to its essentiality has a composite identity-for-something-else, with the difference that the soul unlike these forms is not immanent in the matter (Mulla Sadra, 1996).

In addition, the dependence/connection of an object does not place that object under correlation category because otherwise all accidents should be a dependent and for-something-else existence. The reason is that all accidents are dependent on the essence and have a dependent existence-for-something-else. Besides, the inclusion of a single object within two categories is impossible as an object cannot be placed simultaneously under both quality and correlation categories (Mulla Sadra, 1981).

2. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

One of the most important and challenging issues for philosophers in the past and present age is related to the human soul and the way it interacts with the body. Some have considered the soul and body as matter and form, some have seen them as two distinct things with a composition by way of annexation, and finally some have considered them as having a composition by way of unification.

This study has attempted to address Avicenna’s view about the human soul and the way it interacts with the body, and also determine its strengths and weakness based on Mulla Sadra’s novel ideas including fundamentality of existence, graduation, intensifying substantial motion, and the soul and body composition by way of unification.

According to Avicenna, the non-material soul in the spiritual dominion is like a bird that the soul occurs to it when the body is prepared. In addition, Avicenna believes that the human soul in its generation and survival is an immaterial and spiritual being that assumes a categorical relationship such as the relationship between the captain and the ship. However, according to Mulla Sadra, the soul is a unified and continuous existence between the body and intellectus, whose initial generation is from a material context, i.e. the body, and it moves through intensifying substantial motion toward perfection until it reaches abstraction and immateriality.

One of the serious problems faced by philosophers is the quality of the relationship between an immaterial thing (the soul) and a material thing (the body). To this end, the scholars of wisdom in the West and the East have tried to resolve this problem, but they seem not to have had much success in this regard. But Mulla Sadra, by reducing the distance between the soul and body, could reconcile the duality and unity of the soul and body, and thus solve the problem of conflict between the soul and the body. Before Mulla Sadra, philosophers consider the human soul as having a unified substance from fetus period until death with no change in its essence during the lifetime, and changes are only made in its accidents.

Contrary to previous philosophers, Mulla Sadra believes that the soul at the beginning of its generation has a corporal form that reaches high perfection stages through substantial motion. In his view, the lowest order of the truth of the soul is its corporal form, and the highest order is the rational human soul. Hence, the soul and body, according to Mulla Sadra, are two separate truths that are related to each other, but the soul and body are a single truth in a variety of degrees, in which the body is of the lowest degree and the soul is of the highest degree.

In addition, Mulla Sadra, unlike Avicenna, considers the soul and body as having a composition by unifications and the distinction between the two as subjective and conceptual. For Mulla Sadra, the body is externally of an order of the soul orders and the body's governance is essential not accidental for the soul is intrinsic. That is, the body governance over the soul is related to the mode of existence from which the concept of belonging and composition by way of annexation is abstracted. Besides, the definition of the soul in terms of its composition with the body is a factual definition. Therefore, according to Mulla Sadra, the soul cannot be viewed independently from the body.

Based on what was mentioned, Avicenna and Mulla Sadra have some commonalities and differences in the discussion of the soul.
1. Although both philosophers believe in the contingency of a soul, according to Avicenna, the soul is immaterial in the beginning of its generation, but it is material and corporal in the view of Mulla Sadra.

2. Although Avicenna considers the soul as an immaterial and spiritual matter in the beginning of its generation, and Mulla Sadra considers it as having a corporal from, both believe that the effects of the soul and body are distinct from one another.

3. Although the quality of the soul contingency is not the same for Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, and Avicenna considers the body as the precondition of the occurrence of the soul, and Mulla Sadra regards the body as the material cause of the occurrence of the soul, both philosophers do not see the body and the bodily accidents as the cause of plurality, uniqueness, and distinction of souls and then the cause of the occurrence of the souls, because as long as an object does not have uniqueness and distinction it cannot come to existence.

4. Both Avicenna and Mulla Sadra believe that the quality of the soul is the cause of the composition of the soul with the body, and both consider that as long as the body does not sufficient aptitude the soul will not be a created thing. Also, after the bodily readiness, the soul become intellectually active and is received upon the divine permission.

3. CONCLUSION

There is much controversy among philosophers and mystics concerning the interpretation of the human soul. Avicenna accepted the common definition of the soul proposed by Aristotle and attempted to modify it. According to Avicenna, the soul is the primordial perfection for the natural body. He believed that the soul in the initial stage of its creation is a simple and non-material essence that turns into individual pluralism when it is composed with the body. The human soul occurs when the body comes into existence and then they are mixed as a natural composition. Besides, the relation between the soul and the accidental body is mediated by a set of physical faculties and potentialities.

Avicenna assumes an existence for itself by-something-else for accidents and considers a state of immediacy between them and the essence. According to him, the soul is a complete essence that does not come to existence through perceptual changes in its essentiality but what is added to it through perceptual changes is regarded as secondary perfections.

Although Mulla Sadra accepts the definition of the soul proposed by Avicenna, he tries through his analytical explorations to provide a novel explanation of the soul and eliminate the problems with Avicenna’s definition such as the relationship between the soul and the body. According to him, the human soul is initially a physical existence that passes through some vegetative and animal stages in the light of the substantial and ascending movement and reaches a state of abstraction and immateriality. This suggests that the human soul is a fluid reality with different degrees and levels, the lowest of which is the body and the highest of which is the state of abstraction.

Finally, the rejection of the theory of reincarnation can be regarded as one of the implications and consequences of the substantial motion in the human rational soul. Because in the light of the substantial motion, it is impossible for a soul that has been turned from potentiality into actuality to return back into potentiality, and also the substantial motion is an inherent and irreplaceable process, and thus it is impossible for it to go through a descending order. In addition, based on the substantial motion in the human rational soul, it is possible to consider the physical resurrection as a real process, just in the same way it has been emphasized in the Holy Qur'an and the hadiths of the infallibles (AS).

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